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Abstract. In public distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), such as Blockchains, nodes can
join and leave the network at any time. A major challenge occurs when a new node joining
the network wants to retrieve the current state of the ledger. Indeed, that node may receive
conflicting information from honest and Byzantine nodes, making it difficult to identify the
current state.
In this paper, we are interested in protocols that are stateless, i.e., a new joining node should
be able to retrieve the current state of the ledger just using a fixed amount of data that
characterizes the ledger (such as the genesis block in Bitcoin).
We define three variants of stateless DLTs: weak, strong, and probabilistic. Then, we analyze
this property for DLTs using different types of consensus.
Keywords: Distributed Ledger Technology · Blockchain · Consensus.
1 Introduction
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) are usually partitioned depending on the type of con-
sensus used to order incoming transactions. Here, we consider the three most used classes of
technologies: Byzantine agreement, Proof of Work, and Proof of Stake.
Byzantine agreement protocols [7] are used to maintain consistent states replicated over mul-
tiple servers. It can tolerate crash or Byzantine faults, up to a number that depends on the
synchrony assumption of the communications. Such protocols are executed by known servers in
a fixed network environment, a setting called permissioned. They can easily be used by nodes to
maintain a ledger of transactions. Every insertion in the ledger is the result of a consensus among
participating nodes.
Blockchains based on Proof of Work (PoW) are the first distributed ledger technologies that
work in an environment where nodes can join and leave and any node can participate to the
protocol. Nodes are elected randomly proportionally to their computational power, and an elected
node can append transactions to the ledger. All current PoW Blockchains, including Bitcoin, work
with synchronous communications, and assume correct nodes to have strictly more computational
power than Byzantine nodes.
Blockchains based on Proof of Stake (PoS) are similar to the PoW based ones, but nodes are
elected proportionally to the amount of tokens they own in the blockchain itself. In protocols based
on PoS, a well-known concern is called long-range attacks [2], where a group of nodes create an
alternative chain extending an old block. This is made possible because block generation is not
computationally heavy, and if a node can extend a block at a given time, nothing prevents it from
extending the same block in a different way at a later time. This attack becomes even worse when
the nodes owning a majority of tokens at a previous time, do not have stake at the current time.
Performing such attacks could be appealing as they have nothing to lose. This problem is known
as posterior corruption [1].
Existing Proof of Stake based protocols such as SnowWhite [1], Algorand [4], Ouroboros [6],
have identified such risks. The main solution proposed is to have some sort of checkpointing
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mechanism to avoid considering past majorities of stake holders. A variant of this attack is called
stake-bleeding attacks [3]. It uses other mechanisms such as block rewards and transaction fees to
allow even a past minority of stake holders to execute long-range attacks.
Contributions. In this paper we aim at defining a general model to capture the main difference
between various kind of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs). Our model is abstract enough
to be independent of the implementation and capture only the main mechanisms of the DLTs.
Then, we focus on one property that we call the Stateless Property. We define this property in
our general DLT model and show whether existing technologies satisfies it or not. In particular
the fact that Proof of Stake based DLTs are not Stateless implies the existence of the long-range
attack vulnerability.
We believe that our model could be use independently to capture other properties and compare
technologies in an abstract way.
2 Model
We consider that time is discrete and at each time t ∈ N, Nt represents the set of nodes in the
network. We consider that communication is instantaneous and there is a communication link
between any two nodes in the network at any given time. We also assume that each node is
identified, and is able to securely sign messages.
A distributed ledger is a data structure with an “append” function. It is maintained by a set of
processing nodes. The network receives events and the nodes react to the events according to the
distributed ledger protocol. Each time the ledger is updated, a new time instant begins. Formally,
a DLT is characterized by its initial state I and a state transition function σ that takes a current
state St, the events Et, and the network Nt containing all the nodes that are online at least once
before the next “append”. Then σ returns a new state St+1 when the “append” function is called
at time t + 1. A state can be seen as a sequence of “append” and we write S 4 S′ when state S
is a prefix of state S′, i.e., S′ can be obtained from S by appending data. The state S−k denotes
the truncated state S where the last k occurrences of “append” of S are omitted.
Given a DLT (I, σ), a sequence of N = (Nt)t∈N of networks and a sequence E = (Et)t∈N of
events, we can construct the sequence of states States(I, σ,N , E) = (St)t∈N in the following way
S0 = I and ∀t ∈ N, St+1 = σ(St,Nt, Et).
Stateless DLT. When a new node joins the network, it obtains the current state from the other
nodes in the network. Informally, we say a DLT is stateless if a new joining node is able to deduce
what is the current state of the DLT from the information received from the current network and
by knowing the initial state.
At a given time t, each node u ∈ Nt has a local state LS(u). For a correct node, the local state
is exactly the current state St (communications are supposed instantaneous so all correct nodes
agree on the current state at any time). For Byzantine nodes, the local state is constructed by an
adversary. The set of pairs (u, LS(u)) for all nodes u in Nt is denoted St i.e., St = {(u, LS(u)) |u ∈
Nt}.
Definition 1 (Weakly Stateless DLT). A DLT is weakly stateless if there exists a function f
such that f(I, St) = St.
Definition 2 (Strongly Stateless DLT). A DLT is strongly stateless if there exists a function
f such that f(I, St) = St and, for any subset A ⊂ St, f(I, A) = St or ⊥.
Definition 3 (Probabilistically Stateless DLT). A DLT is probabilistically stateless if there
exists a function f such that ∀k, t, t′ ∈ N, with k ≤ t ≤ t′, f(I, St)−k 4 St′ with probability greater
than 1−O(e−ck) for some constant c > 0.
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3 Examples of Stateless DLTs
Byzantine Agreement Protocols It is well-known that, in a fixed network C of known nodes
where communication is synchronous, consensus is possible and can tolerate up to (|C|−1)2 Byzan-
tine nodes [7].
We denote by σBA the transition function of a Byzantine agreement protocol among the nodes
in C. σBA represents the fact that, at time t, the nodes in C ⊂ Nt perform a Byzantine agreement
to order the transactions received in Et and update the state St accordingly to obtain St+1. In
the Byzantine agreement protocol, we consider that the state contains the information about the
set C of nodes participating in the consensus protocol.
Interestingly, when a majority of nodes in C are correct, any node u outside C can ask the
nodes in C for the current state. Then, the current state is the one received by a majority of nodes
in C, and is guaranteed to be correct. From this we deduce the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For a set of nodes C and an initial state I (which contains the information of C), if
∀t ∈ N, C ⊂ Nt and at most
(|C|−1)
2 nodes in C are Byzantine, then the DLT (I, σBA) is strongly
stateless.
Proof. Assuming at most (|C|−1)2 nodes are Byzantine, for any sequence N and E, all the correct
nodes in C agree on all the state St ∈ States(I, σBA,N , E) for any t ∈ N. The function f returns
the local state that appears in at least |C|+12 pairs associated with a node in C. If no such state
exists (if the set of local states is only a subset of S), f returns ⊥. Formally, we have
f(I, A) = S if |{u ∈ C|(u, S) ∈ A}| > |C|2 , and f(I, A) = ⊥ otherwise. ⊓⊔
Proof of Work Blockchains In PoW Blockchains, there are no assumptions about the nodes
in the network, except that at any time t, in Nt, the computational power of the correct nodes
is strictly greater than the computational power of the Byzantine nodes. Then, the transition
function σPoW applies an ordering on the transactions received in Et (decided by some node in
the network) and appends the block of transactions to state St resulting in St+1. In addition,
from state St, one can compute the proof of work performed until time t, denoted PoW (St). So
PoW (St+1) is the sum of PoW (St) and the proof of work corresponding to the last “append”.
For the initial state I, PoW (I) = 0.
Theorem 2. For an initial state I, if for all t the computational power of correct nodes in Nt is
strictly greater than the computational power of Byzantine nodes in Nt, then the DLT (I, σPoW )
is probabilistically stateless.
Proof. Let f be the function returning the local state that maximizes the Proof of Work, f(I, St) =
argmaxS({PoW (S)|∃u, (u, S) ∈ St}). Such a local state could have been generated by an adver-
sary. If k denotes the number of blocks we have to truncate to obtain a prefix of the correct
state St, then the probability decreases exponentially fast when k tends to infinity. Indeed, let pt,
resp. qt, be the computational power of the correct nodes, resp. of the adversary, at time t. By
assumption, ∀t, pt > qt. Let λt = maxt′≤t(pt′qt′).
From [5] (Th.2), we deduce that, at a given time t, the probability that an adversary rewrites
the last k blocks is in O(e−cz) with c = log(1/(4λt)) > 0. ⊓⊔
4 Impossibility of Stateless Proof of Stake Blockchains
In PoS Blockchains, the consensus at a given time t is possible assuming the nodes owning a
majority of the tokens are correct. So we can assume that the state transition function σPoS is
performed by those correct nodes, owning a majority of the tokens, creating a new state St+1
from state St and incoming events Et. However nothing prevents the nodes in N0 to create an
alternative state after time 0.
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Theorem 3. Even if, at each time, all the nodes owning tokens are correct, the PoS DLT is not
weakly stateless.
Proof. To simplify, assume that, at some time t > 0, all nodes in N0 are owned by the adversary.
Indeed, there is no assumption on the correctness of N0 after time 0. Then, the adversary can
simulate an execution of the DLT in a sequence of networks N ′t where each node in N
′
t is owned by
the adversary and such that there is a bijectionmmapping any nodes in u ∈ Nt to a malicious node
m(u) ∈ N ′t , for all t ∈ N (m(u) = u if u is already malicious). Hence, the sequences of networks
(N ′t )t and (Nt)t differ only in the addresses that identify nodes. The adversary can execute the same
DLT using the same sequence of events (Et)t but in the malicious sequence of networksN ′ = (N ′t )t,
which gives a different sequence of states States(I, σPoS ,N ′, E) 6= States(I, σPoS ,N , E).
At time t, the adversary can connect all nodes N ′t to the network so that the set of local states
is St = {(u, LS(u))|u ∈ Nt} ∪ {(u, LS(u))|u ∈ N ′t}. The set is symmetric as half of the local
states contain St and the other half contain S
′
t and both states differ only in the addresses used
to identify nodes.
States(I, σPoS ,N ′, E) is a valid sequence of states if the sequence of networks was N ′ and if
the adversary creates symmetrically the state St using the sequence of networks Nt. A function f
should answer St in the first case and S
′
t in the second case, with exactly the same input, which
is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
One way to make the PoS DLT stateless is to assume that any set of nodes owning a majority
of the token at a given time t are correct at any time t′ > t. This is a very strong assumption
as for instance, it gives the same kind of trust in the initial set of nodes as in the Byzantine
agreement protocol. Indeed, if the nodes in N0 are still connected at time t then, they act as a
trusted committee. We could even remove the proof of stake entirely and only rely on standard
Byzantine agreement between nodes in N0. In the case where nodes in N0 go offline, they can select
replacement nodes (using any method including election or simply one-to-one replacement), and
include a signed message that define their choice in the state so that any joining node could identify
the current set of trusted nodes. In future work, we plan to identify other sufficient conditions for
the existence of Stateless DLTs.
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